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COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS

THE STATUS OF THE COLLECTIVE LABOR
AGREEMENT IN FRANCE
Robert J. Nye*
THE collective labor agreement has a peculiar status in free
or quasi-free industrial economies. Theorists have attempted
to define this status in terms of long-accepted concepts, but the results of their efforts have constituted merely new grounds for disagreement and controversy. Essentially, the debates have been
predicated on the idea that the collective agreement has the
characteristics and implications of one of two concepts, or that
the collective agreement may be characterized by some combination of these two concepts, that is, (1) the true contract, and
(2) the legislative regulation. Most agree that neither concept in
itself can account for the accepted legal and social effects of the
collective agreement, and they therefore conclude that the agreement partakes of some of the characteristics of both contract and
law.' But the more difficult problem is to what extent the respective concepts can and do assist in a proper definition.
However the collective labor agreement is conceptually defined, its effect on industrial relations, the public and the state
has been ever-widening. In one sense it may be characterized as a
constitution for the government of the industrial community, the
result of the exercise of a delegated legislative authority, but limited
in scope and control by legislative standards. In this sense the agreement is similar to a state constitution, enacted in accordance with the
principles and limited in turn by the standards of the federal
constitution.
Basically the same in all nations, the collective agreement is
subject to various requirements of form and scope in the different
nations. This paper is intended to outline in historical perspective
the statutory, judicial, administrative and social developments
which have made the collective agreement an indispensable accessory to legislative and judicial regulation in France.
* Member, Illinois bar; B.A. 1953, University of Chicago; J.D. 1954, DePaul University; LL.M. 1955, New York University.-Ed.
1 For an interesting examination of French theories to explain the legal basis of the
collective agreement, see Pirou, "The Theory of the Collective Labour Contract in France,"
5 INT. LAB. RYv. 35 (1922).

HeinOnline -- 55 Mich. L. Rev. 655 1956-1957

656

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
THE ACT OF MARCH
FREEDOM

[Vol. 55

21, 1884:

OF ASSOCIATION

Recognition of the legal efficacy of a collective agreement
necessitates the pre-recognition of groups and associations, informal
or formal, which are authorized to conclude valid agreements and
enforce them by appeal to judicial sanction. This development
occurred in France in 1884 as the result of a twenty-year trend.2
The Act of March 21, 18843 removed the previous disabilities of
"industrial associations or societies" 4 and provided (§ 2) that they
"may be formed freely without Government authorization."
This "Magna Charta" of industrial organization 5 did not only
remove the previous criminal sanctions attached to unauthorized
association; it gave industrial associations a new and precious
legal status. Among the new perquisites were the right in a
collective capacity to sue and be sued, the right to acquire property
by gift or by bargain, and the right to administer special funds
.for mutual assistance and pensions.6 The right to enter into
contracts under its own corporate signature was, 6f course, of

enormous importance, and this provision presaged future legislative concern with the collective labor agreement itself.
2
See, for a most complete explanation of the history of trade union legislation, the
trade union movement, and the social, economic and political developments which concurred to persuade the 1884 legislative action, 2 FPEEDoM OF ASSOCIATION 87-99 [I.L.O.,
Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927].
3As mended by the Act of March 12, 1920, Bul. Min. Tray. 1920, p. 33 [I.L.O.,
Legis. Ser., 1920, France 8], as repealed and reenacted as consolidated in the Act to Consolidate Certain Labor Laws (Code of Labor and Social Welfare, Book Ill), dated Feb. 25,
1927, J. Off. (March 1, 1927) No. 50, p. 2483 I.L.O. Legis. Ser., 1927, France 3].
4 SEE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION [I.L.O., Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927]. French statutory history on industrial associations is outlined in Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in France," 1 AM. J. CoMp.
L. 215 at 216 (1952):
"Present day French labor law traces its legislative development at least as far back
as 1791 when the Assembly of the Revolutionary period enacted two statutes, the first of
which abolished the guilds which had exercised a monopolistic control over industry, and
the second of which forbade the organization of workers. Both of these measures were
consistent with the individualistic spirit of the French Revolution, which placed strong
emphasis upon the liberty of the individual and construed it to extend to the 'liberty to
work.' The French Penal Code of 1810 also contained an article prohibiting the concert of
action of workers aimed at the improvement of working conditions. A reversal of this
legislative trend began in 1864, when a statute was enacted limiting the application of
the Penal Code provision just mentioned, and impliedly recognizing the right of workers
to organize for mutual self-improvement for limited purposes. In 1884, the remaining provisions of the Penal Code restricting the rights of organization were removed, and unions
were recognized as legal personalities with some restrictions ..
"
5 See note, I INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF LEGAL DEcIsIONs ON LABOR LAw, 1925, at 90
(I.L.O., Geneva, 1926), where the editor, while applauding the new status, deprecates
repeal of article 416 of the Penal Code as a sanction of the "legality of victimization."
6Act of March 21, 1884, as amended by Act of March 12, 1920, §5.
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But it was not only individual organizations which achieved
legislative recognition. The act provided legal status for associations of industrial associations (i.e., federations of industrial

organizations), and entrusted these bodies, too, with all the rights
and duties of their constituent member associations.7 In France,
as in the United States, we find that this kind of positive legislative mandate became the justification if not the cause of the
growth of tremendous federations of industrial associations. And
it is recognized that in France, if not in the United States, it is
these tremendous federations which define the labor policies
and goals to be pursued through collective bargaining and effected
through the collective contract.
It would be misleading to stop here and leave the impression
that industrial organizations were subjected to no restriction by
the act here described. Restrictions do exist, but they are mostly
of formal, rather than substantive, consequence. What papers
must be filed and where, who may be members of an industrial
association and who may manage or administer its functions, with
what rights and subsisting duties is a member who withdraws from
the association invested: these are but restrictions of form. There
is but one really important restriction which may be characterized
as substantive: "Industrial associations shall have no other purpose than that of studying and defending economic, industrial,
commercial, and agricultural interests."8 At first glance one may
feel hard put to find any other purpose toward which an industrial organization might turn its efforts. But there is one. A
purpose to exercise political power is prohibited, and one need
not think long before it is realized that the exercise of political
power by a militant organization whose membership may number
into the millions constitutes an overwhelming danger to any state.
Happily, although the largest industrial federation in France
(the Confed6ration g6n~rale du Travail) started out with an
orientation which was at least in part political, in 1906 the principle of political neutrality was adopted. Due not entirely to
the statutory restriction above described, but to a great extent
demanded by an explosive internal situation, a conference at
Amiens resulted in an important declaration:
"The Federal Congress of Amiens approves Article 2 of the
constitution of the C.G.T., which reads as follows:
" 'The C.G.T. stands apart from all political schools of
7 Id., §6.
8 Id., §3.
HeinOnline -- 55 Mich. L. Rev. 657 1956-1957

658

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

thought and includes all workers consciously taking part in the
struggle to abolish the wage-earning system and the employers.'
"The Congress considers that this declaration involves the
recognition of class warfare which in the economic field opposes workers in revolt to all forms of material and moral
victimization and oppression introduced by the capitalist
classes against the working classes.
"The Congress adds precision to this theoretical declaration by the following remarks:
"In its daily work trade unionism aims at co-ordinating
the worker's efforts and improving his welfare and condition
by the immediate introduction of steps to shorten hours of
work, to increase wages, etc. This, however, is merely one
side of its task. Using the general strike as a weapon, it is
preparing the complete emancipation of the workers, considering that the trade union, nowadays a militant organization, will in future become a group of producers engaged in
the re-organization of society.
"The Congress declares that this twofold policy of present
and future action is actuated by the unsatisfactory position of
the wage earners, which handicaps the whole of the working
classes and which goes to show that all workers, whatever be
their political and philosophical views, should belong to so
essential an organization as the trade union. The Congress
consequently recognizes the entire freedom of the individual
trade unionist to participate, apart from his union, in any
form of struggle which corresponds to his philosophical or pollitical opinions, and restricts itself to requesting him in return to abstain from introducing into the Union the opinions
which he professes outside it; as concerns organizations the
Congress declares that if the movement is to produce its full
effect, all economic action should be directed against the employers, it being no concern of affiliated organizations as such
to take any account of parties or sects which, outside them
and side by side with them, are free to pursue their work of
transforming society."
Whatever we might think today of the quoted article of the
C.G.T. constitution and of the essentially socialistic aim described
in this declaration, we do see that the Amiens Conference agreed
to restrict union activities to the economic sphere. We must
recognize the fact that French unions are politically oriented
9 See FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 108-109 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial
Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927].
HeinOnline -- 55 Mich. L. Rev. 658 1956-1957
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(so, too, in the main, are those of other continental countries),
but we now know that they have subscribed to a policy of
attaining their political ends primarily through economic conflict. 10
Another restriction had also been imposed on union activity.
Whether or not the drafters of the Amiens Declaration realized
that under the act unions could not act in a commercial capacity
with intent to make and distribute profits among their members,
they expressly ratified the end that the trade union "will in
future become a group of producers engaged in the re-organization of society." The courts, however, interfered." Under the
10 The courts, too, have had something to say about political methods of attaining
union institutional goals: Ministre public v. Leretour, Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 2, 1935)
D.H. 1935.127, and Ministre public v. Ligue des objecteurs de conscience, Trib. civ. Seine
(Oct. 17, 1934) D.H. 1934.596; Sem. jur. 1935.117, in which cases it was held that an
association formed to advocate, encourage, and organize resistance to military obligations,
including conscription, is unlawful; Venue Gras v. Vitilio, Trib. civ. Marseille (on appeal
from Probiviral Court) (Dec. 20, 1929) Gaz. Pal. 1930.1.426; Sem. jur. 1930.622 [English
translation: I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1930, at 105-107], affd. Cass. civ. (Oct. 29, 1930) Gaz.
Pal. 1930.2.848) [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1930, at 107], holding that a worker who takes
part in a day's stoppage ordered by his trade union as an anti-war demonstration, without
his employer's permission, may be dismissed without customary notice, the contract for
hire of services being already broken by his act in participating in a strike for political
purposes; Angevin v. Dubois, Cons. Prud'h. Seine, (Sept. 28, 1927) Gaz. Pal. 1927.2.583,
where the Justice of the Peace said: "This strike was quite unconnected with any corporate or occupational need, and its sole object was a demonstration of sympathy with Sacco
and Vanzetti. In these circumstances, we must hold that the right to strike was wrongfully
exercised and that [the] workers abruptly broke their contract of employment ...
[A] strike which is not directed solely to corporate and trade ends is a breach of the
contract of employment and justifies a claim by the employer for damages." Dr. Ricklin
v. Syndicat medical de Mulhouse et des environs, App. Colmar (July 15, 1924) Rec. jur.
d'Alsace-Lorraine (Feb.-March 1925) S. somm. 1925.2005, where it was held that a professional association (medical organization) cannot for political motives or on the ground
of conflict of opinions, refuse to admit a French citizen among its members or order his
exclusion. Reversed, Cass. civ. (March 14, 1927) Gaz. Pal. 1927.1.599, and on rehearing,
App. Colmar (Feb. 7, 1928) Gaz. Pal. 1928.1.561, on grounds that a medical association
does not exceed its rights in making the admission of new members dependent on certain
conditions which are in themselves justified, such (in the case of an association located
in Alsace) as the candidate's frank, sincere, and unreserved adherence to the French institutions restored by the Treaty of Versailles. [Under French law, associations other than
trade unions enjoy wide latitude in excluding members, with political considerations in
no way prohibited.] But, as to the duty of professional associations to confine themselves to the defense of professional interests and to refrain from an interference in
political matters, see Cass. civ. (Nov. 16, 1914) D. 1917.1.61. For other cases restraining
union political machinations, see cases cited in FREEDOM OF AssociATION 129-130 [I.L.O.
Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927].
11 See, e.g.: Procureur de la Ripublique v. Leretour, Trib. civ. Seine (Jan. 2, 1935)
D.H. 1935.127; Ministate public v. La Ligue des objecteurs de conscience, Trib. civ. Seine
(Oct. 17, 1934) D.H. 1934.596; Sem. jur. 1935.117; Gorgeon v. Thomas d'Hoste, Daudier
et al., Trib. civ. Nantes (judging as a commercial court) (June 15, 1934) D.H. 1934.503,
holding that associations registered under the Act of July 1, 1901 (which includes unions
but expressly disavows affecting the special laws governing industrial associations) cannot
be regarded as commercial companies, even though they are sometimes obliged, in order to
achieve their ends, to engage in commercial operations although such operations are
not carried on for purposes of gain, and profits are not to be distributed among the
HeinOnline -- 55 Mich. L. Rev. 659 1956-1957
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act, 12 the legislative policy seems to be that there can be no partition of union assets among the members. If this is true, and the

judges seem to agree, neither can profits gained from the use of
those assets be so distributed. And this interpretation was expressly reaffirmed in section 16 of the Act of February 25, 1927.13
THE ACT OF MARCH 25, 1919:
COLLECTIVE

LABOR AGREEMENTS

The Act Respecting Collective Labor Agreements of March
25, 1919,14 confirmed the validity of collective agreements negotiated by industrial associations with employers or employer associations. This was the first French legislation to define the collective contract and provide formal and substantive requirements
for its valid conclusion. The term "confirmed" is justified, for
the courts had previously been forced to recognize the validity
of collective contracts. The right to contract for the promotion
and defense of collective interests, expressed in the Act of 1884,
required such a decision. In a most notable case 15 the Court of
Cassation affirmed the legal nature of collective agreements concluded by industrial associations, and their right to take legal
action "in order to assure the protection of the collective interests
of the trade represented as a whole by the association." 16
French trade union leaders (Syndicalists) had, at first, abhorred the idea of collective bargaining as a mode of action to
achieve their ends. However, after World War I their attitude
changed and they accepted with enthusiasm the new method.
Their acceptance, associated still with a political flavor, however,
was expressed in a statement made at the Congress of the C.G.T.
held in Lyon in 1919:
"It would be a profound error to see in collective agreements
a form of collaboration [between employers and unions]. The
collective agreements whether they cover a plant, an area or a
nation-wide occupation have transformative values, because
members. See, also, discussion in FREEDOM OF AssocrATioN 130 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports,
Ser. A (Industrial Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927].
12 Act of March 21, 1884, as amended, §7, 3; Act to Consolidate Certain Labor Laws,
dated February 25, 1927, §9.
13 Act to Consolidate Certain Labor Laws (Code of Labor and Social Welfare, Book
III), J. Off. (March 1, 1927) No. 50, p. 2483 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1927, France 3].
14 Bul. Min. Tray. XXVI, 74* [I.L.O. (Basle) Bul. vol. XIV (1919) pp. 41-47, France 1].
15 Cass. r~un. (April 5, 1913) (D. 1914.1.65).
16 See, for an explanation of this extra-legal (i.e., without express statutory authorization) development, FREEDoMi or AssoCIATION 149-150 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports, Ser. A
(Industrial Relations), No. 29, Geneva, 1927].
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they limit the authority of the employers, because they reduce
the relations between employers and employees to a bargain
which encourages the effort without dulling the energy, since
the worker has thus the satisfaction of reducing the employers'
absolutism by introducing into the workshop or plant the
by the emcontrol of a power not subject to exploitation
17
ployer, of a force of emancipation: the union."'
One writer has concluded that the legislative intent behind enactment of the Act of 1919 was more an effort to reduce union
political orientation than a recognition of changing legal and
social concepts: "By establishing the legal basis of collective
agreements, the conservative majority of the Chamber elected
in 1919 hoped to direct the energies of French syndicalism into
new, less political, and less revolutionary channels."' 18
Whatever the pressures which convinced the French legislature
to bring forth the act, it must certainly be characterized as a
logical conclusion to a series of legal, social and political events.
The act codified the essence of rules which had emerged in judicial decisions, providing a statutory basis for collective agreements, but it also maintained the theory of contractual strictness.

Collective agreements were negotiated without governmental
intervention, and were binding only on the parties signatory
thereto. One important result of the strictly contractual nature
of agreements governed by the provisions of this act was that:
"[I]t was possible for heads of undertakings who were not
affiliated to employers' associations to evade the obligations
accepted by the associations, even when the associations were
the most representative ones in the trade concerned. It was
therefore not unnatural that some employers hesitated to bind
themselves to certain conditions of employment which might
place them at a disadvantage as compared with competitors
who were less interested in improving the conditions of their
workers."19
And it was found as a fact that in the period between the end of
World War I and the date of the next revision of the law relating
to collective agreements, in 1936, there was a remarkable contrast between the degree of legislative concern to promote collec17Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB.
237 (1951).
18 Ibid.
19 Pouillot, "Collective Labour Agreements in France," 37 INT.
(1938). Thus, Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS.
236 at 237 (1951), states: "As far as immediate effects are concerned,
"
of 1919 was of little consequence ...
HeinOnline -- 55 Mich. L. Rev. 661 1956-1957
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tive agreements and the extent of practical application and adoption of collective agreements. 20
During the years immediately following its enactment, the
courts were presented with a variety of issues relating to the
nature and extent of the provisions of the Act of 1919. One
question which arose was whether there were collective agreements which are not regulated by the act. Reacting in the affirmative, the Civil Tribunal of St. Etienne 21 held that a contract
fixing the scale of wages, and entered into between an association
"whose object it is not to group in a trade union the workmen
belonging to it" and workmen, some of whom were members
of this association, and some not, does not constitute a collective
agreement for work within the meaning of the act. In that case
'the contract was entered into for a period of eighteen years. Under
the act a collective contract could not be made for a definite
period exceeding five years. Then, too, a member of an association who has so contracted with the association cannot release
himself from the contract by withdrawing from membership.
Under the act, a member of an industrial association can, by withdrawing from membership, be released from the obligations of
a collective agreement to which the association is a party.
It seems that the court in this case had a false idea of the
true nature of a collective agreement. The essence is not agreement between an industrial organization and workmen who belong
to it or not; a collective agreement is one entered into by a labor
organization and an employer, employers or an association of
employers. The writer's intent is not to argue the validity of
the decision, but it seems strange that a court would feel bound
to reason that "some collective contracts are not governed by
the act respecting collective contracts," instead of reasoning that
"this contract is not a collective contract and is therefore not
governed by the act respecting collective contracts." The line
of reasoning of the court has not been followed in any succeeding
case brought to the attention of the writer, but neither is it necessarily obviated by the type of reasoning followed by the Court of
20
See, e.g., Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
236 at 237 (1951); Report, "Collective Agreements in France," 31 INT. LAB. RIv. 700 at
704 (1935), summarizing an extensive inquiry carried out by the French National Economic
Council. But, cf. Pirou, "The Theory of the Collective Labour Contract in France," 5
INT. LAB. RIv. 35 at 36 (1922).
21 Syndicat gdndral des Tisseurs de la Loire et ]a Haute-Loire v. Jamot, Merlat, and
Armand, Trib. civ. St. Etienne, 2d Ch. (Jan. 21, 1925) D.H. 1925.281. For an English
translation of the case, see I.L.O., Int. Survey of Legal Decisions on Labor Law, 1925, at
109-111 (Geneva, 1926).
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Cassation in a 1928 decision in which the nature of a collective
agreement is defined:
"The object of a collective agreement which is concluded
between a group of wage-earning or salaried employees and a
group of employers or a single employer, is to determine beforehand certain conditions of employment. Neither of the
contracting parties undertakes to pay a wage to the other
party in exchange for work promised by that party, and there
is no bond of subordination between the parties. The agreement therefore has not the characteristics of a contract for

hire of services ..

*"22

The thesis that it is only the contracting parties and those
whom they represent who are bound by a collective agreement
has been subject to limitations evolved from the very nature of
the civil law. Historically, one of the sources of law in the
civil law tradition has been local custom. The Act of July 19,
1928, amending section 23 of Book I of the Labor Code, provides
in subsection 3 of said section that "any clause in an individual
contract or works rules fixing a period of notice less than that
established by custom or by collective agreement shall be null and
void in law." This provision overruled in essence the previous
practice engaged in by the Court of Cassation by which it had
held that provisions of a collective agreement cannot be cited
except against the groups which are parties to them or against
groups, employers, or employees which had adhered to them
in the manner and within the time-limits provided by the Act of
1919.23 If the Act of July 19, 1928 can be interpreted to mean that
a collective agreement may contribute to create usages in matters
of notice of discharge, and if this usage constitutes "custom"
within the meaning of the Act of 1928, provisions of a collective
24
agreement can be cited against parties not signatories to them.
22Al4pde v. Lang, Cass. civ. (Jan. 4, 1928) S. 1928.1.86; D.H. 1928.152 [I.L.O., Dec.
Lab. Law, 1928, at 84], and Pastergue v. Sodct6 frangaise de peintures et vernis, Cass.
civ. (March 4, 1929) S. 1929.1.267; Sem. jur. 1929.541 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 90].
23 See, e.g., Ruaro v. Fiori, Cass. civ. (Feb. 11, 1929) S. 1929.1.208; Sem. jur. 1929.426
[I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 91 and 92].
24 With regard to works rules indicating or crystallizing consistent usage, see: Socit6
anonyme des Ateliers et Chantiers de la Gironde v. Jusseaume, Cass. civ. (June 27, 1929)
Gaz. Pal. 1930.1.680, sub-note (a) [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1930, at 81-82]; and Agius v.
Ruaro, Cons. Prud'h. Marseille (Sept. 23, 1930) Gaz. Pal. 1930.2.981 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab.
Law, 1930, at 83-84].
With regard to works rules becoming a constituted and accepted usage, see: Compain
v. Socit des Etablissements Sauter et Harl6, Cass. civ. (July 31, 1930) D.H. 1930.457;
Gaz. Pal. 1930.2.314 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1930, at 84-85], reversing a case identical
on the facts and lower decision as a case decided by the Tribunal Civil de la Seine, 7th
Ch. (July 20, 1929), Socidt des Establissements Sauter v. Carratoni, D.H. 1929:454; Gaz.
HeinOnline -- 55 Mich. L. Rev. 663 1956-1957
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But the Act of July 19, 1928 disturbs an entire theory de25
veloped by the Court of Cassation with regard to works rules:
"[T]his theory treated works rules as a tacit collective agreement and raised them, in pursuance of section 1134 of the
Civil Code, to the status of contractual law between the
parties, on the strength of a presumption or fiction of implied
but deliberate acceptance of all the clauses of the works rules.
The 1928 Act, on the other hand, treats works rules as a
body of employment conditions imposed by the will of the
employer, as opposed to regulation by collective agreements
"21
between employer and employed ...
At the same time, however, the Court of Cassation reversed only
one of the inferences which it had drawn from the theory of works
rules as an implied collective agreement, namely, the binding
nature of works rules fixing periods of notice, and not the theory
27
itself.
Pal. 1929.2.146 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 94-95]. The Court of Cassation held that
acceptance of a work rule regarding notice without protest by employees of the Paris
metal industry for many years had not the effect of abolishing a prior usage and substituting for it another usage, and that the usage arising out of acceptance of the work
rule does not take the place of the old usage within the definition of the word "usage"
in the Act of 1928. Accord: Decottignies v. Deberghe et Lafage, Cons. Prud'h. Seine,
(March 9, 1929) Gaz. Pal. 1929.1.749 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 93-94]; and Soci~t6
La Manufacture Ardennaise v. Briard, Trib. civ. Charleville (Dec. 24, 1929) Sem. jur.
1929.598) [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1929, at 95-96]. Contra: Mignot et Bquet v. Faure,
Cons. Prud'h. Seine (March 7, 1931) D.H. 1931.216 [Extract of English translation, I.L.O.
Dec. on Lab. Law, 1931, at 80-81]. But see Levan v. Socidtd mdtallurgique de l'Escaut,
Cass. civ. (July 28, 1931) D.H. 1931.523; Gaz. Pal., 1931.2.796, where it was held that
when old usage in an industry within a given district fixes the period of notice to be
observed by the parties in case of cancellation of the contract at a fortnight, the judge
cannot set aside this usage simply by recalling that in the great majority of undertakings
in the same industry and the same district works rules of long standing have abolished
notice without arousing the hostility of the workers, and that this new usage must be
established by a showing that it has been freely and generally followed, particularly in
works where there are no works rules; and Socit Manufacture d'armes de Paris v.
Carr6, Trib. ,iv. Seine (June 1, 1933) D.H. 1933.421; Gaz. Pal., 1933.2A80, and Socitt
des Etablissements Sautter-Har v. Compain, Cass. civ. (May 2, 1933) D.H. 1933.316; Gaz.
Pal., 1933.2.101, both of which cases hold that a practice arising out of shop regulations or
individual contracts, which do not involve the free consent of the worker, who agrees
from ignorance or constraint to the requirements of the employer, cannot derogate from
ancient usages, and that only a collective agreement can do that.
2
5E.g., Cass. civ. (Nov. 21, 1927) Sem. jur. 1928.45, where analogy between works
rules, and an agreement concluded by an employer with his employees collectively, led
the court to declare lawful and binding a clause in the works rules which exempted the
parties from observing the periods of notice fixed by local custom.
26 Note, I.L.O., International Survey of Legal Decisions on Labor Law, 1929, at
96-97 (Geneva, 1930).
27 With regard to works rules constituting a tacit collective agreement, see: Cheyssial
v. Bailly, Cons. Prud'h. Toulon (May 18, 1928) Sem. jur. 1928.1133 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab.
Law, 1928, at 90-91], where it was held that a clause excluding payment for overtime
inserted in works rules was a lawful stipulation in a tacit collective agreement. Cf.,
contra, Dr. Treille v. Vigier, Trib. civ. Lyon (Nov. 16, 1927) Gaz. Pal. 1928.1.240; D.H.
1928.131; Sem. jur. 1928.301 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1928, at 88-90].
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In 1925, the Court of Cassation rendered a decision which has
been cited as authority for the proposition that "a collective
contract cannot be a bar to individual contracts freely entered
into in a regular form." 28 In reality, however, the court refused
to hold that individual contract provisions conflicting with those
of a collective contract are valid. The court's entire decision was
based on the fact that "the union [did not] indicate what breaches
to the collective contract could be ascribed to the company."
29
Prior to this decision, however, the Civil Tribunal of St. Nazaire
had decided that workmen and an employer who are bound by
a collective agreement for work can alter the latter through their
individual agreements. Whether a collective agreement controls even in the presence of less favorable provisions in individual contracts of employment is an issue which must be resolved
if the nature and status of a collective agreement is to be defined.
But the 1925 decision of the Court of Cassation does constitute a
positive step forward in recognizing precedence of the collective
agreement. To the extent that the decision in that case may be
interpreted to mean that the court refused to affirm that individual agreements can alter the terms of collective agreements,
it has repudiated its 1910 decision that collective agreements have
no effect on non-conforming individual contracts of employment.3 0 It is but reasonable that the French courts should have
taken a step-although not a bold one-away from the strict concept of contract. Although the Act of 1919 did provide for the
effects and enforcement of collective agreements in subchapter
IV, it did not expressly give to collective agreements the effect
of supersedure. A close reading of the act, however, does justify
this conclusion. 31 And it is further justified by the fact that all
collective agreements are intended to regulate working conditions, although to varying degrees. One interesting treatment
has thus stated: "All collective agreements, in so far as they regulate working conditions, lay down in advance the conditions of
employment that must form part of every individual contract of
28 Syndicat des dessinateurs de Nantes v. Socidt6 des ateliers de constructions de
l'Ouest, Cass. dv. (Jan. 5, 1925) Rev. Prud. 1925.75 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1925, at 108].
See note, I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1925, at 108.
29 Syndicat des M~tallurgistes de St. Nazaire v. Chauden et ateliers de la Loire, Trib.
civ. St. Nazaire (July 12, 1922) D. 1925.2.1 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1925, at 104].
30 Cass. civ. (July 7, 1910) 1 D.P. 201.1911. See, for a discussion of development of
the French judicial attitude on this point, Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial
Peace in France," 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 215 at 228-229 (1952).
81 See, particularly, §§Slq, 31s, 31t, 31u. Bul. Min. Trav., XXVI, 74* [I.L.O. (Basle)
Bul., vol. XIV (1919) pp. 41-47, France 11.
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between persons bound by the collective
employment concluded
32
agreements."
By 1937, however, the Court of Cassation had reached the
point where it consistently upheld the validity of collective agreements notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary in an individual contract of employment between an employer and an
employee who were bound by a collective agreement. Thus, the
clauses of a collective agreement are mandatory, and it is not permitted for such persons to depart from them. 3 This final step
may have been hastened by the additional provisions inserted
into the Act of 1919 by the Act of 1936. The latter provisions
reinforced in another context the binding nature of collective
agreements, and may have convinced the courts that the nature
of a collective agreement is consistent with the idea of a regulatory
34
measure.
THE

ACT OF

JUNE

24, 1936:

SUBSTANTIVE REGULATION AND

35
EXTENSION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

The Act of June 24, 1936 followed closely a conference held in
the early part of June 1936, at which were present representatives
32 COLLECTVE AGREEMENTS 125 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports, Ser. A (Industrial Relations), No. 39, Geneva, 1936].
33 Glatigny v. Lecacher, Cass. civ. (Nov. 17, 1937) D.H. 1938.68, quashing a judgment
which refused to grant a worker the benefit of wages laid down in a collective agreement
on the ground that the clause of an individual agreement stipulating a lower wage was
still in force. See, also, Socid t Pharmacie centrale du Nord v. Dame Eysseric, Trib. civ.
Seine (June 23, 1937) D.H. 1937.512 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1937, at 73], where it was
held that an employee who has accepted a lower rate of wages is always entitled to
require the employer to pay him the rate prescribed in the agreement, because the
collective agreement makes any individual contractual agreement ineffective. For an exception based on the concept of force majeure, see, Grandjean v. Sodctd des Etablissements
Erisol, Cass. civ. (June 17, 1937) D.H. 1937.439 [I.L.O., Dec. Lab. Law, 1937, at 74].
34 See, Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. R.EL. REv. 236
at 237 (1951), where he states that the law of 1919 led to "interesting discussions about
the legal nature of the collective agreements, which helped to prepare the second phase
of their history. A number of jurists, led by Professor Duguit, questioned the legal
classification of the collective agreements. They are not simple contracts, but of a
different legal nature: they are 'actes-rZ.gles,' statutes of the profession having a character
similar to that of public statutes. This concept made rapid progress among the labor
lawyers and has become the predominant legal interpretation in France. It was officially
endorsed by the legislature under the Popular Front regime of 1936 and was made the
cornerstone of the new law adopted on June 24, 1936, as a consequence of the famous
'Accords Matignon' of June 7, 1936." For an incisive comment on legislative and judicial
attitudes and criteria with respect to labor legislation, see, Lambert, Pic and Garraud,
"The Sources and the Interpretation of Labour Law in France," 14 INT. LAB. REV. 1
(July 1926).
35 Act to Amend and Supplement Chapter IV bis of Part II of the First Book of the
Labor Code, Entitled "Collective Agreements," J. Off. (June 26, 1936) No. 149, p. 6698
[I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1936, France 7], as amended by the Decree Respecting Production of
May 2, 1938, J. Off. (May 1, 2, 3, 1938) No. 104, p. 4951; (May 8, 1938) No. 109, p. 5266;
(May 20, 1938) No. 119, p. 5658; Aug. 10, 1938) No. 186, p. 9458 I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1938,
France 5].
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of the (employer) French Confederation of Production, the
(employee) General Confederation of Labor (C.G.T.), and the
government. As we have seen, the Act of 1919 did very little
to promote the conclusion of collective agreements between
labor organizations and employers. The conference was the result of recognition by industrial and governmental forces of the
immediate necessity for mitigating the economic effects of severe
sitdown strikes which occurred in May and June of 1936,88 and
the more mediate but no less necessary objective of placing "the
relations between employers and workers on a more stable footing. ' '37 The conference led to the Accord of Matignon

(so-

named from the hotel in which the Accord was concluded) on
June 7 and 8, 1936, signed in the presence of the Prime Minister
by the representatives of the two confederations.
The Matignon Agreements were, in fact, a set of rough-draft
generalizations which were shortly thereafter incorporated by
process of deduction and expansion in the Act of 1936. They
recognized that workers may freely exercise the right of association, that workers cannot be hired, disciplined, or given work
assignments by consideration of their belonging or not belonging
to a union, and that a liaison system of workers' delegates must
be instituted to relay worker grievances concerning application of
legislation or collective agreements to the employer. But most
important for our purpose was Article 1 of the Accord: "The
employers' delegation agrees to the immediate preparation of
collective contracts of employment."
The Act of 1936 includes three salient features: (1) collective
bargaining was to be by "joint committee[s] . . . composed of

representatives of the most representative industrial organizations
of employers and employees in the branch of industry or commerce in question for the region under consideration, or for the
whole territory of France if a national agreement is envisaged;"38
(2) the requirement that certain substantive and procedural
S6Report, "Collective Agreements in French Commerce," 59 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATIoN 198 (I.L.O., Geneva, 1936); Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace
in France," 1 Am. J. Coase'. L. 215 at 217 (1952); CoLLEcrivE AGREEMENTS 84 [I.L.O.,
Studies and Reports, Ser..A (Industrial Relations) No. 39, Geneva, 1936].
37 Poufllot, "Collective Labour Agreements in France," 37 INT. LAB. Rav. 1 at 7 (1938).
See, also, Hamburger, "The Extension of Collective Agreements to cover Entire Trades
and Industries," 40 INT. LAB. Rav. 153 at 166 (1939), where it is reported that it was not
only employer and employee industrial associations which felt the need to stabilize
employment relations, but that "one of the leading points on the programme of the
new [Popular Front] Government was the encouragement of collective agreements.
33 Act of June 24, 1936, §31va, 2.
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stipulations be incorporated in the collective agreement; 39 and
(3) the concept of extension of the collective agreement to third
parties by order of the Minister of Labor.40 Each of these three
points effects a radical change in the status of the collective
agreement as defined in prior French legislation. And, since
the changes constitute not only a difference in approach from
earlier French law but a difference from United States law either
in degree or in principle, several problems raised by the act will
be examined.
The first problem to be considered is what is a "most repre-sentative industrial organization"? The source of the phrase is
generally conceded to be Article 3, paragraph 5 of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization, where it is used
to govern the appointment of employer and worker delegates to
the Conference of the Organization. 41 A decision of the Permanent

Court of International Justice on July 31, 192242 gave very little
assistance. With respect to the ILO provision, the only conclusion which was warranted was that "all other elements being
equal, the number of members would be decisive in determining
the representative character of the organization.

' 43

But labor

organizations are as different with respect to elements other
than size as human beings. To attempt a clarification of the
phrase, the Minister of Labor issued a Circular on August 17,
1936. Restating the decision of the Permanent Court, "Numbers
are not the only test of the representative character of the organizations, but they are an important factor," the Circular went on
to say:
"If it is found that membership in the organization is not
actually free, but that it was brought about by means of pressure or through the influence of certain employers, the extent
to which the union is qualified to negotiate with the employer
concerning the occupational interests of the workers and employees is open to question ...
39 Id., §3lvc.
40 Id., §§31vd, 3lve, 31vf.
41
See, Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 236
at 238 (1951); Pouillot, "Collective Labour Agreements in France," 37 INT. LAB. REV.
1 at 8-9 (1938).
42
Publications, Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B: Collection of
Advisory Opinions, No. 1, July 31, 1922 (Leyden, 1922), at 19: "Numbers are not the
only test of representative character of the organizations, but they are an important
factor; other things being equal, the most numerous will be the most representative."
43 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REt.. REv. 236 at
238 (1951). And Hamburger, "The Extension of Collective Agreements to cover Entire
Trades and Industries," 40 INT. LAB. REv. 153 at 172 (1939).
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"In addition to the number of members, other criteria may be
taken into account, for instance, the length of time during
which the members have paid their contributions and the
amount of the contribution. In view of the fact that the
creation of occupational organizations is not subject to complicated and costly legal formalities, they can be established
with the greatest facility. Therefore, for an organization
to be considered the most representative, it should be able to
show, both by the amount of the contributions and the regularity of payment, that there exists a bond of a certain permanence between the organization and its members
and not
44
only a fortuitous and temporary connection.
The minister of Labor also indicated that more than one
organization in a particular industry or area might be the "most
representative. '4 5 The designation of the "most representative"
industrial organizations is placed within the discretion of the
Minister of Labor or his representative,4 6 but appeal was permitted "to the Higher Arbitration Court (Cour superieure
d'arbitrage) and, after its suspension by decree of September 1,
1939, to the Conseil d'Etat, a High Court specially dealing with

the legality of administrative actions.

.

.

.

"4

It may be noted,

in comparison, that there exists no direct judicial review of an
NLRB certification of the bargaining representative for an
employee unit, nor of an administrative determination of the
"appropriate" unit to be represented by a certified representative.48
On May 28, 1945, the Minister of Labor issued another
Circular dealing with the same definition. 49 Several new features
44"Definition of Representative Industrial Organizations in France," 52 INT. LAB.
Rav. 680 at 681 (1945).
45 See Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. AND LAB. REL. R.Ev.
236 at 239 (1951), where the rationalization for this ministerial decision is restated:
"For this interpretation . . . its advocates appealed to the 'spirit of French individualism,' the great ideological diversity of the French workers, etc. No less important,
it may be assumed, was the strategic need of preventing the C.G.T.-although at that
time under strong non-Communist leadership-from obtaining a trade union monopoly
at the expense, in particular, of the Catholic labor organization and of the Confddration
Gdndrale des Cadres de l'Economie Fran~aise (C.G.C.E., created in 1937) (Since 1944
this organization has called itself C.G.C. It organizes higher and technical employees.]."
46 Act of June 24, 1936, §31va.
47 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 236 at
239 (1951). See, for a decision by the Council of State upholding an administrative determination of "most" representativeness, DRorr SocuLL, 18th Year, No. 4, April 1955, pp.
224-225 [Reported in English, 14 INDUS. & LAB. 196-197 (I.L.O., No. 4, Aug. 15, 1955)).
48E.g.: American Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 813 U.S. 146 (1941); Inland Empire District Council v. Millis,
325 U.S. 697 (1945); May Dept. Stores Co. v. NLRB, 826 U.S. 876 (1945).
49J. Off. (June 28, 1945) p. 8915.
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may be noted, however. A natural effect of World War II and
the Occupation was to render "patriotism" a more conscious
criterion for all positions of privilege. Thus, the new Circular
stated that the patriotic services performed by industrial organizations and their record with regard to the enforcement of
social legislation should also be taken into account. The Circular
said that the General Confederation of Labor (C.G.T.) and the
French Confederation of Christian Workers satisfy all the conditions necessary to "most representative" status. But we must
not conclude that only these two unions constitute the sole bargaining representatives for labor in the French scheme. The
Circular provides: "A trade union may be found to be qualified
to represent the interests of an occupation so far as a region is
concerned, or locally, or within an undertaking, whereas the
federation or confederation to which it is affiliated is not qualified
to do so at the national level." Thus, "the representative character of a trade union organization may be judged, as the case
may require, from either the occupational or the territorial
(whole country, district, locality, undertaking) point of view,
and sometimes with different results. .

. ."5

And the second

Circular clarifies the meaning of the minister's original declaration that "most representativeness" in a particular industry or
area is not limited to one organization. We now see that the
French system contemplated a concept of representation very
similar, if not identical, to that which has developed under
American law. Both systems subscribe to a concept of "exclusive representative" for purposes of representation of the. employees in a particular unit. In France such a unit was defined
in terms of "occupation" or "territory"; in the United States
the unit for bargaining is defined in terms of "appropriateness."
To the extent, therefore, that a labor organization in France is
recognized as "most representative" in an appropriate "occupational-territorial" unit, it could also be recognized as the "exclusive representative" for an "appropriate bargaining unit" in the
United States.
The Act of February 11, 195051 finally incorporated the criteria
set out by the Minister of Labor in his several Circulars. Most
concisely, all the criteria have been stated by one writer as:
1. Membership; the number of members should be duly
0LAB o R-MANAGEmENT Co-oPEATioN IN FR CE 15 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports
(n.s.) No. 9, Geneva, 1950].
51 Section 31f, J. Off. (Feb. 12, 1950) No. 38, p. 1688; (Feb. 22, 1950) No. 46, p. 2087;
(March 13, 1950) No. 63, p. 2828 EI.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1950, France 6].
HeinOnline -- 55 Mich. L. Rev. 670 1956-1957

1957 ]

COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS

checked, without, however, such supervision constituting an
infringement of freedom of association;
2. Independence; membership must be really free and
without any pressure or influence of the employer; works
unions do not provide the necessary guarantees from this point
of view;
3. The length of time during which members have paid
their subscriptions, regularity of payment, and the amount
of the subscription, all circumstances which prove the existence of a permanent bond between the union and its members and provide the union with the resources which ensure
its independence;
4. The experience and age of the groups, the effectiveness and continuity of their social activities, their constructive
spirit, achievements and moral influence;
5. Their patriotic attitude, their record under the5 Vichy
2
regime and their loyalty in applying social legislation.
The legislative policy of the United States government, as
embodied in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 3
provides only, in section 8 (d), that collective bargaining is
"... the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party,
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
French policy under the Act of 1936 is to require stipulations
with respect to a number of matters to be incorporated in the
collective agreement. This is, in effect, to insist that the parties
negotiate with respect to these matters. The act does not limit
the agreement as finally concluded from incorporating stipulations as to matters beyond and more favorable than those required, but the validity of a collective agreement depends mainly
on agreement as to the specified matters. In essence, the matters
52LABOUR-MANAGMENT CO-OPERATON IN "RANcE 15 [I.L.O., Studies and Reports
(n..) No. 9, Geneva, 1950]. Several intermediate revisions have been analyzed in Sturmthai, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUs. & LAB. RxL. RLV. 236 at 240 (1950),
and "The Question of the 'Most Representative Organizations,"' 58 INT. LAB. RLav. 660
at 661-662 (1948). These intermediate revisions were jointly issued by the Prime Minister
and the Minister of Labor on March 13, 1947 and April 8, 1948.
53 49 Stat. 449 (1935), amended by 61 Stat. 186 (1947), 62 Stat. 991, 1286 (1948), 63
Stat. 880 (1949), 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§141-197.
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with relation to which agreement is necessary are (1) affirmation
of employee freedom of association and opinion; (2) institution
of elected workers' delegates; (3) minimum wages; (4) period
of notice;

(5) organization of apprenticeship;

(6) grievance

procedures; and (7) procedures for revision or amendment of the
agreement.
The strictly contractual theory of collective agreements lost
ground in the Act of 1936, never to be renewed. For, in addition
to restating in amended form the 1919 provision that industrial
associations not parties to a collective agreement may subsequently adhere and become bound by it, 54 the new act instituted

a novel (for France) procedure by which collective agreements
may be extended and "rendered binding upon all the employers
and employees in the occupations and regions within the scope
of the agreement. . .

."5

And, by 1938, the power of the Min-

ister of Labor, by order, to so extend a collective agreement had
been exercised in several instances. 56 Not long after the extension procedures of the Act of 1936 became a subject of discussion
and inquiry, the question arose whether certain provisions of
an agreement could be excluded from the extension and whether
partial extension was permissible. In 1937, the National Economic Council declared that such "partial extension" is permissible.57 The Act of 1936, then, has added to the voluntary and
consensual type of collective agreement, another type: "[T]he
agreement which, by virtue of Government intervention, re54 Act of 1919, §31j, as amended, Act of 1936, art. 2. In deciding the binding
character of such adherence by an employer under the Act of 1919, the Cour d'appel de
Bordeaux, in Biere v. Union bordelaise des syndicats de l'imprimerie, November 5, 1935,
(S. 1936.2.159) held that when a manufacturer has adhered to a collective agreement
concluded between an employers' association of which he is not a member and the
workers' union for the occupation, the union is entitled to require its performance. It
seems, however, that such adherence by a single employer will no longer be binding
under the amendment introduced in the Act of 1986. Whether such adherence would
be binding under the traditional dvii law concepts may be another question.
55Act of 1936, §31vd. See, for a discussion of extension and the nature of the
collective agreement, Pouillot, "Collective Labour Agreements in France," 37 INT. LAB.
REv. 1 at 10 (1938). For the sources and history of extension, see Hamburger, "The Extension of Collective Agreements to cover Entire Trades and Industries," 40 INT. LAB.
Rxv. 153 at 162 ff. (1939), and Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in
France," 1 AM. J. Compn. L. 215 at 226 (1952).
56 E.g., silk weaving industry, motor industry, Paris metal industry. Preliminary note,
INTERNATIONAL SuRVEY OF LEGAL DEcIsIONS ON LABouR LAW, 1936-1937, at 110.
57 Conseil National Economique, LEs PRoBLEMEs POSFS PAR L'EXTENSION DES CON-

VENTIONS CoLumcrvxs Du TRAVAIL, 1937, at 9. See Hamburger, "The Extension of Collective Agreements to cover Entire Trades and Industries," 40 INT. LAB. R . 153 at 174 (1939).
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ceives after its adoption the status of general rule applying to
the whole occupational group and region. . . ."'l

Also in 1936 the French legislature enacted what has proved
to be the basis for a third category of collective agreements. The
Act of December 31, 1936 concerning conciliation and arbitration
in collective labor disputes59 made provision for compulsory
procedures to settle collective disputes which affect commerce
or industry. Conciliation was to be attempted first, with arbitration following where the conciliation process failed. The details were to be specified by administrative decrees,60 in the absence of these details being stipulated in the collective agreement
involved in a particular dispute. And a most spectacular change
in concept was made by section 6, which provides: "The reasons
for the arbitration award shall be stated, and there shall be no
appeal against it. It shall be binding. It shall be published."
At last a chink in the armor of civil law disavowal of the concept
of precedent is perceived.6 ' Arbitrators, in the performance of
their essentially judicial functions, were compelled to justify their
decisions logically. Appeal to precedent is the natural effect of
the existence of a body of reasoned decisions. And it must be
concluded that the French legislature meant that general rules
of industrial behavior were to be developed. That the reasons
for the arbitration award shall be stated and that the award shall
be published demonstrates this intent.
But several disturbing problems arose with relation to the
Act of December 31, 1936: (1) aggravation of disputes caused by a
58Preliminary note, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF LEGAL DEcISIONS ON LABOUR LAW,
1936-1937, at 110.
59J. Off. (Jan. 1, 1937) No. 1, p. 127 [English translation, I.L.O., Legis. Series, 1936,
France 17]. For the considerations which led the French government to introduce a
compulsory procedure of conciliation and arbitration, see Maurette, "A Year of 'Experiment' in France: I," 36 INT. LAB. REv. I at 17-18 (1937). See, for the Acts of July 18,
1937 [J. Off. (July 19-20, 1937)] and January 14, 1938 [J. Off. (Jan. 14, 1938); LE TEMPS,
Jan. 14, 1938], which provided, respectively, for prolongation of certain collective agreements and of the powers conferred on the government by the Act of December 31, 1936,
and for prolongation until February 28, 1938 of the provisions of the decrees issued under
the Acts of December 31, 1936 and July 18, 1937, 63 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 220 (1937)
and 65 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 145 (1938).
60 Decrees were issued: Decree of January 16, 1937, J. Off. (Jan. 17, 1937), as amended
by the Decree of September 18, 1937, J. Off. (Sept. 19, 1937). For a description of the
events leading up to adoption of the act and a summary of the Decree of January 16,
1937, see, 61 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 232 (1937). A summary of the chief amendments
in the Decree of September 18, 1937 may be found in 64 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 211
(1937).
61 And Professors Lambert, Pic, and Garraud, "The Sources and the Interpretation
of Labour Law in France," 14 INrT. LAB. REv. 1 at 14-15 (1926), reinforce the conclusion
that this disavowal has been merely spoken but not intended, and professed but not
effected.
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complicated system of conciliation by stages as set forth in the
administrative decrees; (2) insufficient definition of the powers
of arbitrators and umpires; (3) absence of the right of appeal
from an umpire's decision attacked' on grounds that the umpire
was not competent to make such an award, that he exceeded his
powers, or that the award was contrary to law; (4) legal effect of
an arbitrator"s or umpire's award interpreting the provisions
of a collective agreement or of a wage agreement; (5) absence of
provision for revision, by arbitration, of wage clauses in collective
agreements during the term of the agreement, when the cost-ofliving index rises dangerously. To resolve these problems the
French legislature passed the Act of March 4, 1938.62 With respect to the first problem, section 2 provided that only one attempt at conciliation will be made, failure of which will be immediately followed by arbitration. With respect to the second
problem, section 9 of the act provided that arbitrators and umpires may not decide any points other than those set out in the
report recording failure of conciliation, that their decisions are
to be based on the rules of the general law in the case of disputes
involving legal issues, and that in other collective disputes decisions are to be based on equity. With respect to the third problem,
section 13 and 14 provide for appeal to a newly constituted
Higher Court of Arbitration (Cour superieure d'arbitrage). With
respect to the fourth problem, section 18 provides that an award
interpreting provisions of a collective agreement or wage agreement has the same effect as a collective agreement if it is registered
in accordance with section 31c of the Act of 1919.163 With.respect
to the fifth problem, section 10 provides for review of wage
clauses when the official cost-of-living index varies five percent
or more from the "index number at the date nearest to the date
64
on which the wages in question were fixed."
62 J. Off. (March 5, 1938) No. 54, p. 2570 [English translation, I.L.O., Legis. Series,
1938, France 1]. The act was supplemented by a Decree of April 20, 1938, J. Off. (April
20 and 23, 1938); Bulletin de la Confdd&ation gdn rale du patronat fran~ais, (June 15,
1938), the substance of which is found in 67 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 362-363 (1938).
A simplification of the Act of 1938 procedure was the object of a legislative decree of
November 12, 1938, issued under the Emergency Powers Act of Oct. 5, 1938, a summary
of which may be found in 68 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 364-369 (1938).
63 One writer in 1937 felt the need for a penalty to enforce arbitration or umpire
awards. Maurette, "A Year of 'Experiment' in France: I," 86 INT. LAB. RaV. 1 at 19
(1937): "There is one possible omission [in the Act of December 31, 1936]: if the decision
of the arbitrators or the umpire is not carried out by one of the parties, no penalty can
be enforced. . . ." The question seems to have been rendered moot, in view of the
1938 provision that such awards may be enforced as collective agreements.
64 A detailed analysis of ihe Act of March 4, 1937 may be found in 65 INDUS. & LAB.
INFORMATION 349 (1938). An examination of settlement procedures existing prior to the
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WORLD WAR II EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AND THE ACTS OF
THE VICHY REGIME

Beginning on the first day of September 1939, emergency decrees were issued which, inter alia, dealt with the status of the
collective bargaining agreement and conciliation and arbitration
procedures. The Decree of September 1, 19395 suspended the
application of laws and regulations concerning conciliation and
arbitration, and the application of provisions concerning the review of wages in collective agreements and contracts of employment. But the concept of the collective agreement as the industrial supplement to legislation was not thereby destroyed. In
an official statement issued by the French Ministry of Labor on
October 13, 1939,66 it was pointed out that "the state of war is
not in itself a sufficient reason for the termination of contracts of
employment. The war has not affected collective agreements
concluded between employers' and workers' organizations, and,
in the absence of supplementary agreements in the form of additional clauses, all provisons of collective agreements must be
fully observed."6 7 In a statement made on October 20, 193968 to

the Labor Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, the Minister of
Labor assured his audience that the collective agreement system,
which was the keystone of the whole French social structure, would
be maintained subject to changes which might be required by unforeseen events. 69
A Decree of October 16, 193970 suspended the working of the
National Economic Council for the duration of the war and set
up a Permanent Economic Committee to assume the necessary
duties during the period of hostilities. A memorandum to the
decree explained that the National Economic Council was not
adapted to wartime requirements and that "a smaller permanent
Act of December 31, 1936 may be found in CONCILIATION AND ARBIRATION IN INDUSTRIAL
DISPUTES, French national monograph at 170-186 [I.L.O., Studies & Reports, Ser. A
(Industrial Relations) No. 34, Geneva, 1933].
65J. Off. (Sept. 6, 1939), amended by the Decree of September 8, 1939, J. Off. (Sept.
9, 1939), which provides that the Minister of Labor, when he thinks fit, may introduce a
system of conciliation and arbitration applicable throughout the war. All the provisions
of the decree are summarized in 71 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 339-341 (1939).
66 LE TinPs, October 14, 1939.
67Note, "The War and Collective Agreements in France," 72 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 216 (1939).
68 LE TEMPs, October 21, 1939.
69 Note, "The War and Collective Agreements in France," 72 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 216 (1939).
70J. Off. (Nov. 2, 1939).
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committee is in a much better position to deal immediately with
all questions and requests addressed to it by the various Ministries concerned." As was the council, however, the committee
was to be composed of representatives from the most important
71
trade organizations of workers and employers.
The Decree of October 27, 193972 provided that conditions of
employment established by collective agreements in force on the
first of September 1939, and by arbitration awards which had
become binding by the same date, would remain in force for the
duration of hostilities for those employers and employees in the
trades and districts within the scope of such agreements and
awards. Conditions under which changes might be made in
conditions of employment so fixed were to be specified in a subsequent decree.
The Legislative Decree of November 10, 193973 explained
the government's policy with respect to collective agreements and
other matters involved in the industrial sphere. The new regulations introduced substantial changes in the system of collective
agreements formerly established by the Act of June 24, 1936.
Specifically, the decree provided for the establishment of two different systems, one to apply to industries and undertakings not
involved in national defense and the other to apply to those which
were engaged in defense work. In the former industries and
undertakings, the terms of existing collective agreements and arbitration awards could be revised either by mutual agreement between the organizations concerned or at the request of one of
them. The procedure for revision by request of one party was
set forth, to be supplemented by decrees. In any case, any changes
would come into effect only after approval by the Minister of
Labor, from whose decision there was no appeal. In addition,
the clauses of collective agreements and arbitration awards could
be modified by the Minister of Labor when they "appear to him
to be incompatible with the requirements of production or labor
output." In particular, the minister could set the wage scales for
a given trade or district. In the latter industries and undertakings, conditions of employment, whether or not specified in collective agreements or arbitration awards, were frozen ("stabilized") as of September 1, 1939. Conditions of employment could
71 Note, "Wartime Legislation in France," 72 INDUS. & LAB. INFORMATION 292 (1939).
72J. Off. (Nov. 1, 1939) No. 267, p. 12,787 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1939, France 21 (D)].
73J. Off. (Nov. 16, 1939) p. 15,143; J. Off. (Nov. 22, 1939) p. 13,298. For details in
English, see, note, "Wartime Legislation in France," 72 INDUS. & LAB. INFORmATION 292295 (1939).
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be modified only by joint decision of the Minister of Labor and
the minister directly concerned. Civil penalties were provided
for employers who paid wages in contravention of the provisions
of the instant decree or subsequent ministerial decisions. And a
Decree of June 1, 1940 affirmed the authority of the Minister of
74
Labor to fix wages.
On August 16, 1940 the Vichy Regime dissolved trade union
confederations and employer federations, 75 and the act of that date
was later implemented by a Decree of November 19, 1940, which
"ordered dissolution of the C.G.T. and of the C.F.T.C. and of
a somewhat ephemeral semi-Facist organization, the Confederation des Syndicats Professionels (C.S.P.F.), which had been founded in 1937 in conjunction with the Parti Social Fran ais. ' ' 76 Before the implementing decree was issued, however, the Vichy
Regime proclaimed its "Charte du Travail," the Act of October
4, 1941 Respecting the Social Organization of Occupations, 77 by
which free trade unions and free collective bargaining were abolished. The act prohibited strikes and lockouts, 78 provided that
"occupational activities shall be divided among a specified number of industrial or commercial families . . . " organized for
"joint management of the occupational interests of their members of all categories" and for "collaboration . . . ,9 provided
for the formation of local unions whose membership was composed automatically of every person engaged in an occupational
activity in the appropriate "category, area and occupation .... 8o
placed strict limits on the administration, functions and purposes
of these "unions,"8 ' and stated rules for the formation of regional
and national federations of unions.8 2 Provisions relating to organization and workings of unions and federations were later supplemented by two decrees on August 28, 1942.83
74 Sturnthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 236 at
241 (1951).
75 See I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1940, France 10, for text and citation.
76 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. REtL. REv. 236 at
241 (1951).
77J. Off. (Oct. 26, 1941) No. 293, p. 4650 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1941, France 7].
78 Act of October 4, 1941, §5.
79 Id., §1.
80 Id., §§9-12.
81 Id., §§14-18.
82 Id., §§19-22.
83 Decrees Nos. 2134 and 2136, J. Off. (Sept. 7, 8, 1942) No. 215, p. 3070) [I.L.O., Legis.

Ser., 1942, France 13]. The Vichy Acts of Aug. 16, 1940 and Oct. 4, 1941 were the subject

of an ordinance promulgated by the Algiers Provisional Government on July 27, 1944 [J.
Off. (Aug. 30, 1944) No. 72, pp. 776-777, as amended, J. Off. (Sept. 27, 1944) No. 83, pp.
837-838 (I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1944, France 5 and 13)], which provided for the reconstitution
of employer and employee industrial organizations and for the restoration of their property.
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PRESENT STATUS OF THE

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT

On October 27, 1946, after having been approved by a referendum, a new Constitution of France was promulgated. 4 The
preamble expressed principles concerning the rights of workers,
and the body included provisions concerning the Economic Council, the advisory arm of the French Parliament. The preamble
reads, in part:
"It is every man's duty to work, and every man has the
right to obtain employment. No one's rights, as regards work
or employment, may be impaired because of his origin, his
opinions or his beliefs.
"Every man may defend his rights and interests by collective action and may join the union of his own choosing.
"The right to strike is exercised within the limits of the
regulations fixed by the law.
"Every worker takes part, through his representatives,
in the collective fixing of conditions of work as well as in
the management of undertakings."
Two months after promulgation of the new Constitution of
the Fourth French Republic, the Act of December 23, 1946 Respecting Collective Labor Agreements was enacted.8 5 In essence,
the act reaffirmed the principles incorporated in the Act of 1936.
But there were several significant differences.
First. The French Legislature felt that until the national
economy was stabilized and peace-time production revitalized,
wages should continue to remain in the control of the Minister
of Labor.86 Since 1939, wage levels had been determined, not by
free negotiation, but by governmental decree. The time had not
yet come when the legislature could entrust the economy to the
effects of economic forces which had been held in abeyance for
87
seven years.

Second. The law marked a reversal to the concept of free
collective bargaining in that it required the minister's approval for
all collective agreements.88 No agreement was valid or binding
See note, "The New French Constitution," 54
84J. Off. (Oct. 28, 1946) p. 9166.
INT. LAB. REV. 364-367 (1946), for extracts from the text.
85J. Off. (Dec. 25, 1946) No. 301, p. 10,932; J. Off. (Jan. 5, 1947) No. 5, p. 138
[I.L.O, Legis. Ser., 1946, France 15].
86 Part IV, Rates of Remuneration, and Part V, Transitional Provisions.
87 A survey of wage regulations may-be found in LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION
ra FRANcE 63-70 [I.L.O., Studies & Reports (n.s.) No. 9, Geneva, 1950].
88 Act of December 23, 1946, §31D.
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unless it had received such approval, and approval could be withdrawn at the discretion of the minister on his own initiative or
on application by an organization of employers or employees concerned.8 9
Third. Approval of a collective agreement by the minister
implied an automatic extension of the approved agreement to
all "public undertakings or nationalized establishments which,
owing to the nature of their work, normally come within its
scope." 90 And an approved agreement could be extended to
"industrial and commercial establishments of the State or to public authorities 9' by a joint Order of the Minister of Labor and
Social Security, the Minister for Economic Affairs and the Minister concerned." 92 Two writers who have dealt with the Act of
1946 have asserted that these provisions effect an automatic extension of a collective agreement to all occupations or enterprises
within its scope. Their words have been:
"His approval carried with it the automatic 'extension' of
its terms to all occupations or branches of the industry within the locality or limits laid down in the agreement; thus such
agreements took on the effect of public regulation insofar as
the non-participating parties were concerned."9 31
"His approval implied at the same time the 'extension' of the
agreements. Thus no agreement was valid unless the Minister approved it; and such approval made the agreement
automatically a public regulation for the entire occupation
or branch of industry within the local limits laid down in the
agreement itself. The former division of agreements into
two classes-those with limited validity and those 'extended' to
nonrepresented employers and employees-disappeared.. .. 94
It is submitted that there is question as to whether (1) approval
by the Minister of Labor automatically extended the terms of an
agreement to all occupations or enterprises within its scope, and
(2) the act has reduced "the former division of agreements" to
89 Id., §31G.
90 Id., §31F, 1.
91 The translation of this phrase may be erroneous. The French text reads"... ou
des collectivit~s publiques . . .," and should be translated "or of public authorities

[bodies]." The question is important to the meaning of the section.
92 Act of December 23, 1946, §31F, 2.
93Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in France," 1 Am. J. COMP.
L. 215 at 219 (1952).
94 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. Rm. R . 236 at

241 (1951).
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one undifferentiated type rather than that the act has further
diversified collective agreements into a triad of types, namely:
(a) approved agreements which are automatically extended to
"public undertakings or nationalized establishments," (b) approved agreements which may be extended by order to "industrial
and commercial establishments of the State or to [sic, of] public
authorities [sic, bodies]," and (c) approved agreements for which
there are no provisions in the Act of 1946 by which extension may
be authorized to private industrial and commercial establishments and undertakings. The author has found no judicial,
legislative or regulative decisions, nor has he found any ministerial memoranda which would resolve the problem so posed.
But it does seem unlikely that the Act of 1946, characterized as
a reconstitution of free collective bargaining, a reaffirmation of
the legal efficacy of freely negotiated collective agreements, and
a reversal of authoritarian concepts which were initiated three
years after the Act of 1936 and subsequently expanded, would
eliminate a principle which had found favor in the minds of
labor, the legislature, the government and the employers in June
of 1936. An interpretation of section 31F of the Act of 1946
which precludes, by implication,95 the extension of approved
collective agreements to all but public undertakings, nationalized
establishments, and industrial and commercial establishments
of the state or of public authorities, abrogates the acceptance of
extension to all "employers and employees in the occupations and
regions within the scope of the agreement.

.

. " found in section

31vd of the Act of 1936, and returns the French collective agreement, so far as this concept is concerned, to the strictly contractual
basis prescribed by the Act of 1919. In any case, it may be presumed that the authors quoted above erred, insofar as the Act of
1946, absent authoritative interpretation, does not authorize
automatic extension to the extent that they have assumed.
Fourth. The confusion which had previously existed with
regard to whether employees who are not members of the employees' representative union are affected by the terms of an
agreement binding his employer and the union was eliminated.
The Act of 1946 provided:
"In every establishment which falls within the scope of an
95This interpretation could be justified by the rule "inclusio unius est exdusio
alterius," to eliminate from a positive or prohibitive legislative direction an event or
circumstance which, while otherwise included under the general intent of a statutory
provision, is excluded by virtue of its absence from a list of events or circumstances.
specified in the statute.
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agreement, the provisions of the said agreement shall be
binding in respect of employment relations arising from individual or gang contracts, save where the clauses of the said
contracts are more favourable to the employees than those of
the agreement.''9 6

Thus, an employer who is subject to the terms of a collective agreement cannot bind himself to give and an employee to take, terms
and conditions of employment less favorable than those specified
in the collective agreement. The same result is obtained in the
United States through the provisions of section 9 (a) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended:
"Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment...."

In France, the employer who is bound by a collective agreement
cannot contract, within the collective agreement's occupational
scope, for terms less favorable than those in the collective agreement; in the United States, the employer who is bound by a
collective agreement cannot contract for terms less favorable than
those in the collective agreement because the bargaining representative of his employees represents, by law, all the employees,
nonunion as well as union, in the particular bargaining unit.
In French theory the employer is bound because the act says that
he is bound; in American theory the employer is bound because
96 Act of December 23, 1946, §31, %3. The history of this problem is outlined in
Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in France," 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 215
at 225, n. 12 (1952) where he states:
"The 1919 Act provided that a person bound by the agreement must apply it to his
legal relations with third parties, unless there was a specific clause to the contrary.
"Two situations had to be considered:
"(1) Where both employer and employee were bound by the statute: the collective
agreement could not be abrogated by individual agreements, in sharp contrast to the
previously existing law.
"(2) Where only one of the parties was bound by the agreement: the party thus
bound was presumed to have applied the agreement, unless he stipulated to the contrary; but if he did so he was liable in damages.
"The system of the statute was consequently that the employer could stipulate in
the collective agreement that he wanted to apply it only to the members of the contracting
union. If he did so, he was free to make individual contracts with outsiders; if he failed
to do so, he could still make valid contracts at variance with the collective agreement;
but he was presumed not to have done so, and if he had explicitly done so, he was liable
in damages for failure specifically to secure this right in the collective agreement. The
1936 Act apparently made no significant change in this respect."
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he has so contracted with all his employees through their representatives.
Fifth. As was the case under the Act of 1936, 9 7 collective

agreements could be concluded for an occupation or industry at
98
the national, regional, local, or individual undertaking level.
However, "The Act has been designed with a view to creating
a chronological order in respect of the conclusion of the various
agreements; national agreements should be concluded first and
agreements for undertakings last."9 9 The Act of 1936 had no
such design. The 1946 act provided that agreements for individual establishments shall govern conditions of employment
only within the limits allowed by national, regional or local
agreements, 100 and, in addition, that individual collective agreements "shall not contain any provisions less favourable to the
employees than those in the special local, regional or national
agreements which apply to the establishment concerned."' 0'1
On February 11, 1950, the most recent French act relating to
collective agreements was passed by the French legislature 02 The
Act of 1950 replaces the Act of 1946, the acts respecting conciliation and arbitration of December 31, 1936 and March 4, 1938,
and all other enactments and decrees which had been issued
under them. With regard to its scope:
"It applies to all private employers and employees, particularly specifying industry, commerce, agriculture and related occupations, professional work, Government departments and
offices, domestic service, caretakers, homeworkers, and private
associations. It does not apply to nationally owned undertakings save to the extent that their personnel is not subject to
special rules issued by Act or regulation; the list of nationally
owned03undertakings having such rules will be issued by decree."
97 Act of June 24, 1936, §31va.
98 Act of December 23, 1946, Divisions II and III. For a review of the decrees which

set forth the criteria for determinations of the representative character of industrial
organizations for purposes of concluding national agreements, see LABOUR-MANAGEMENT

Co-oPERArvE IN FRANcE 71, n. 1 [L.O., Studies & Reports (ns.) No. 9, Geneva, 1950].
99 LABOUR-MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION iN FRANcE 71 [I.L.O., Studies & Reports (ns.)
No. 9, Geneva, 1950].
100 Act of December 23, 1946, §31Q.
101 Id., §31R.
102 Act No. 50-205 Respecting Collective Agreements and Proceedings for the Settlement of Collective Labor Disputes, J. Off. (Feb. 12, 1950) No. 38, p. 1688; J. Off. (Feb. 22,
1950) No. 46, p. 2087; (March 13, 1950) No. 63, p. 2823 [I.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1950, France 6].
103 Note, "Collective Agreements and Industrial Disputes Procedure in France," 3
INDUS. & LAB. 290 at 291 (1950).
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For several years immediately preceding enactment of the
Act of 1950, pressure had increased for a return to the system
of freely negotiated collective agreements, as incorporated in the
Act of June 24, 1936. In 1948 and 1949, gradual increase in
production enabled the government to remove controls over
prices, rationing and exchange in large sectors of the economy.
Why, the workers questioned, should controls remain over wages
and collective agreements? Employee organizations called for the
restoration of free wage bargaining.
In November 1949, the government introduced a bill 0 4 intended to govern collective agreements and specify the procedures
for settlement of collective disputes. The text of the bill was
preceded by a memorandum in which the government explained
why it considered either a return to the rigid scheme laid down
by the Act of 1946 or a reversion to the pre-war system inappropriate:
"The negotiation of national collective agreements subject to ministerial approval has often proved to be most cumbrous; yet the workers ought to be enabled to conclude wage
agreements without delay, since these constitute one of the
essential elements in the collective agreement as a whole....
"The 1946 legislation led to the conclusion of a large number of collective agreements with widely varying scope and
thus to an excessive diversity in conditions of employment,
such as would no longer be compatible with the existence of
an extensive nationalized sector and with the need for a sound
employment policy."'10 5
The bill consisted of two parts: one related to collective agreements, the other to adjustment of collective disputes by compulsory conciliation and arbitration. The first part found little
opposition, especially since it impliedly provided for the free
determination of wages, explicitly rendered collective agreements
valid without governmental approval, and reenacted the desirable features of the 1946 law. But the second part was vigorously
opposed by the trade unions. They argued that compulsory
arbitration procedures would derogate from the right to strike
that had been expressly guaranteed by the new Constitution.
And employers feared that government price and exchange controls would return if compulsory arbitration, "with the pyramid
104 No. 8444, National Assembly, Chamber of Deputies, 1949 session. Appendix to
the minutes of the sitting of Nov. 22, 1949.
105Note, "Collective Agreements and Industrial Disputes Procedure in France," 3
INDUS. & LAB.

290 at 291 (1950).
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of labor courts which the government proposal provided," were
enacted. 10 6 Unanimous opposition by employers' and workers'
organizations was reflected in the Economic Council and by a
majority of the National Assembly. The Economic Council
pointed out that "Part II of the Bill relating to conciliation and
arbitration constitutes an infringement of the right to strike,
which figures in the Constitution, and a contradiction of the
principle of a return to the free negotiation of agreements.' 1 7
Parliamentary discussions resulted in compromises.
In the text as finally enacted, the government was able to
salvage two main controls.
First. The Minister of Labor is able to determine, in his
own discretion, whether collective agreements shall be extended
to employers and employees not represented by the parties to
the agreement. 08 Extension was to be no longer automatic in
any case. The union demand that the automatic extension provisions of the Act of 1946 should persist was refused. 0 9
Second. A governmentally - appointed Superior Collective
Agreements Board is to determine, by reference to a model budget,
the minimum guaranteed wage ("minimum vital") which, when
accepted by "Decree adopted by the Council of Ministers on the
advice of the Minister of Labour and Social Security and the
Minister responsible for economic affairs . . .

,"

shall constitute

the minimum wage for all occupations. 1 0 In thus retaining ultimate control over the minimum wage, the government felt assured that no general wage increase due to an increase in the
minimum would occur.
1o See, for summaries of the arguments against the compulsory arbitration provisions
of the government bill, Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 236 at 244 (1951), and note, "Collective Agreements and Industrial Disputes
Procedure in France," 3 INDUS. & LAB. 290 at 296-297 (1950). Two pre-war works on
French labor courts may be consulted for information as to the special judicial system
which has existed in this field in France: Binet, "Labor Courts," 37 INT. LAB. REV. 463,
466 (1938); and LABOR COURTS 89, French national monograph [IL.O., Studies & Reports,
Ser. A (Industrial Relations) No. 40, Geneva, 1938].
107 Opinion of the President of the Economic Council on Bill No. 8566, National
Assembly, Chamber of Deputies, 1949 session. Appendix to the minutes of the sitting of
Dec. 1, 1949.
108 Act of 1950, §31j.
109 Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. EL. REv. 236 at 243
(1951).
110 Act of 1950, §31x. Under a Decree of March 3, 1950, J. Off. (March 4, 1950),
amended by a Decree of April 15, 1950, J. Off. (April 16, 1950), the seats reserved for
the workers' and employers' representatives were distributed among the various "most
representative" trade unions. Final membership was fixed by an Order of April 25, 1950,
J. Off. (April 26, 1950), after the organizations entitled to be represented had notified
the government of the names of their representatives. See note, "Collective Agreements
in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. 177 at 178 (1950).
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The Act of 1950 abandoned the "strict hierarchy""'1 of the
Act of 1946112 by which national agreements must have been
negotiated before regional or local agreements could be concluded, and by which such regional or local agreements must have
been negotiated before agreements relating to individual establishments within the occupational or territorial scope of the prior
agreements could be concluded.
"Under the preceding legislation, the most representative
organizations of employers and workers in joint session were
required to conclude agreements at the national level, and it
was only within the general framework thus laid down that
regional and local agreements found their place ... .
However, if a national agreement has been concluded in a given
trade or occupation, the more restricted-scope agreements are
only able to adapt its provisions, or certain of its provisions, to
the needs of the particular area; such restricted-scope agreements
cannot vary the provisions of a national agreement by concurrence as to less favorable terms. But such agreements can contain
new stipulations. 114
The Act of 1950 prescribes an extended list of stipulations
which must be incorporated into national collective agreements. 115
The subjects which have been added to the mandatory from the
permissive category are
(a) Employees' delegates and works committees, and the
financing of the social and benevolent associations managed by the said committees;
(b) Holidays with pay;
(c) The procedure for the revision, amendment or termination of all or part of the collective agreement;
(d) The procedure agreed upon for conciliation, according to which collective labor disputes which may arise
between the employers and workers bound by the agreement are to be settled;
(e) The special conditions of work for women and young
persons in the undertakings covered by the agreement.
And the permissive category has been expanded by the specifica-

IIl Sturmthal, "Collective Bargaining in France," 4
243 (1951).

INDUS.

& LAB. REL. RE V. 236 at

312 Act of 1946, §31M, 3; §31Q.
113 Note, "Collective Agreements and Industrial Disputes Procedure in France," 3
INDUS. & LAB. 290 at 292 (1950).
114Act of 1950, §31i.
115 Id., §31g.
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tion of additional subjects which may, inter alia, be included in
national agreements.
The procedures for the adjustment of collective disputes are
set forth in Part II of the Act of 1950.118 Under the act, every
collective agreement must contain provisions respecting con117
tractual conciliation proceedings for the settlement of disputes.
Where, however, a collective dispute is not the object of an agreed
conciliation procedure provided for in the agreement or by supplemental agreement, it must be brought before a national or
regional conciliation board of tripartite character, including
representatives of the employers and workers in equal numbers,
plus not more than three persons representing the public authorities. Administrative regulations are authorized to provide
for the detailed rules respecting composition, working and territorial jurisdiction of the boards. 118 Arbitration, after failure to
achieve agreement by the compulsory conciliation procedures,
is completely voluntary. Agreement to arbitrate disputes may
be made in the collective agreement or by any supplemental or
ad hoc agreement. 1 9 As under the Conciliation and Arbitration
Act of 1938, the arbitrator may not decide any points other than
those mentioned in the record of failure to achieve conciliation,
but he may decide "those points which, being the result of events
which take place after the said record was made, are a consequence
of the dispute under consideration."' 2 0 And, again:
"The arbitrator shall give decisions on the law involved,
in points in dispute, respecting the interpretation and execution of the statutes, regulations, collective agreements or
agreements in force.
"The arbitrator shall give equitable decisions on other
points in dispute, in particular when the dispute concerns
wages or conditions of work not fixed by any statutes, regulations, collective agreements or agreements in force, and on
points in dispute respecting negotiations concerning clauses
in collective agreements and the revision of such clauses.
116J. Off. (Feb. 12, 1950) No. 38, p. 1688; J. Off. (Feb. 22, 1950) No. 46, p. 2087;
(March 13, 1950) No. 63, p. 2823 rI.L.O., Legis. Ser., 1950, France 6].
117 Act of 1950, §7.
118 Id., §8. A Decree of February 27, 1950, J. Off. (Feb. 27-28, 1950), No. 51, p. 2337;
amended J. Off. (March 5, 1950) No. 56, p. 2523, laid down the methods of enforcement
of these provisions concerning national and regional conciliation boards. See note, "Collective Agreements in France, 4 INDUS. & LAB. 177 at 179 (1950), for a summary of the
provisions of the decree. An English translation of the text may be found in I.L.O.,
Legis. Ser., 1950, France 2.
119 Act of 1950, §§9, 10.
120 Id., §11.
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"All decisions of arbitrators must be accompanied by the
reasons therefor.
"No appeal may be made against suchu decisions, save in
the manner provided for in Chapter IV.1 21

Chapter IV establishes a Superior Court of Arbitration to hear
appeals brought by the parties against any decision of an arbitrator on grounds that the decision is ultra vires or contrary to law.
Of whom the court is to be composed and what its procedure
shall be are set forth in general form, with details to await
specification by administrative regulations. 122 Chapter V of Part

II governs the execution and legal efficacy of conciliation agreements and decisions of arbitration boards. And the pre-war concept, that a conciliation agreement or arbitration award affecting the interpretation of the clauses of a collective agreement has
the same effect as the collective agreement itself, persists.
In May and June 1955, two decrees were issued.1

23

The first

laid down a procedure for mediation in industrial disputes which
was intended to facilitate conclusion of collective and wage agreements. The supplementary decree contained administrative regulations. The mediation procedure is resorted to on application
by one of the parties or by order of the Minister of Labor either
when conciliation procedures have failed to settle a dispute or,
if both parties agree, immediately on occurrence of a dispute.
Immediate voluntary submission is deemed unnecessary, however, if the minister decides that a dispute over wages or other
remuneration is such that the general interest precludes the

normal procedure. In such cases he may order immediate
mediation.
One final question may be pursued. Is there any duty imposed on French employers and employee organizations to bargain
collectively? The answer, if we look for an express provision to
this effect, is "No"; but if we look to the inferences which may
be justifiably drawn from the Act of 1950, the answer must be
"Yes." We in the United States are not so concerned with whether
the duty may be inferred from inexplicit provisions: we have
121 Ibid.
122A Decree of March 15, 1950 provided for the method of enforcement of the
statutory provisions concerning the Superior Arbitration Courts. See, note, "Collective
Agreements in France," 4 INDUS. & LAB. 176 at 179 (1950).
123 May 5, 1955, No. 55-478, J. Off. (May 6, 1955) 87th Year, No. 108, p. 4493; June
11, 1955, No. 55-784, J. Off. (June 12, 1955) 87th Year, No. 139, p. 5923. A summary of
their provisions may be found in note, "Mediation in Industrial Disputes in France," 14
INDus. & LAB. 271 (No. 6, Sept. 15, 1955).
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sections 8 (a) (5), 8 (b) (3) and 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. But even without them, the duty to bargain collectively could probably be deduced. French law requires that all collective disputes be submitted to conciliation.
Insofar as conciliation is but an extension of collective bargaining, a direction by the French legislature that conciliation is
mandatory amounts to the imposition of the duty to bargain.
French law also authorizes the Minister of Labor to convene mixed
commissions to negotiate collective agreements, either at the
request of one of the parties or organizations concerned, or on his
own initiative. 2 4 "It would seem obvious that, if these commissions are to fulfill their purpose, attendance and good faith participation in the negotiations would be required. However, the law is
silent on this point and no sanctions are set forth."', 25 But French
courts have never been averse to enforcing a moral duty or duty of
conscience not granted express legal efficacy by the legislature. 126
It may be that future developments will demonstrate that the
duty to bargain in good faith has gained sanction in the judicial
2
mind.1 7
124 Act of 1950, §§31f and 3lh.
125 Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace in France," I Am. J. COMP.
L. 215 at 220 (1952).
128 For cases where French courts found acknowledgment of a "natural obligation"
valid and binding, see, e.g., CompayrA v. Combes, Cass. civ. (March 11, 1918) S. 19181919.1.170; Franc v. Azema, App. Toulouse (Dec. 28, 1892) S. 1893.2.209; Spouses BerrierDrouin v. de Cambaceres, App. Paris (Nov. 8, 1892) S. 1894.2.191; Tibayrenc v. Bureau
de Bienfaisance de Narbonne, App. Montpellier, 1892, D.P. 1894.2.15; Faure v. Rougier,
Cour de Grenoble, 1860 [Dalloz, Jurisp. Gen. Vol. 11, Supp. "Obligations," §885, n. 1].
127 It has been noted that voluntary action on the part of the parties in the industrial
sphere has been less than encouraging: Reynard, "Collective Bargaining and Industrial
Peace in France," 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 216 at 220 (1952); Powell, "Activities of French
Labor Unions in 1949-51," 72 MONTHLY LABOR RE iEW 642 (1951). For affirmance of
the view that "The effects of judicial practice are more original in a branch of law such
as labour law .... ," see Lambert, Pic, and Garraud, "The Sources and Interpretation
of Labour Law in France," 14 INT. LAB. Rxv. 1 at 14-15 (1926). And, notwithstanding
the absence of penal or civil sanctions to compel good faith bargaining in France, collective agreements have been negotiated in a number of important industries. See, e.g.,
notes: 5 INDus. & LAB. 108 (1951) (metals); 6 id., 326 (1951) (textiles); 6 id., 378 (1951) (domestics); 9 id., 246 (1958) (chemicals); 15 id., 292 (1956) (automobiles).
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